An unconventional approach for optimal stopping under model ambiguity is introduced. Besides ambiguity itself, we take into account how ambiguity-averse an agent is. This inclusion of ambiguity attitude, via an α-maxmin nonlinear expectation, renders the stopping problem time-inconsistent. We look for subgame perfect equilibrium stopping policies, formulated as fixed points of an operator. For a one-dimensional diffusion with drift and volatility uncertainty, we show that every equilibrium can be obtained through a fixed-point iteration. This allows us to capture much more diverse behavior, depending on an agent's ambiguity attitude, beyond the standard worst-case (or best-case) analysis. In a concrete example of real options valuation under volatility uncertainty, all equilibrium stopping policies, as well as the best one among them, are fully characterized. It demonstrates explicitly the effect of ambiguity attitude on decision making: the more ambiguity-averse, the more eager to stop-so as to withdraw from the uncertain environment. The main result hinges on a delicate analysis of continuous sample paths in the canonical space and the capacity theory. To resolve measurability issues, a generalized measurable projection theorem, new to the literature, is also established.
Introduction
Decision making under model ambiguity (or, uncertainty) has been extensively studied, dominantly in the worst-case or the best-case scenario: strategies are found to maximize the worst-case, or the best-case, expected value. In practice, few individuals are so pessimistic (or optimistic) that solely the least (or the most) favorable situation dictates their behavior. In this paper, a new framework for handling model ambiguity is introduced: ambiguity attitude of an agent is included as a core ingredient, leading to a more realistic spectrum of behavior.
We focus on optimal stopping. Classically, an agent chooses a stopping time τ to maximize his expected discounted payoff E P [e −rτ g(X τ )].
(1.1)
In the face of model ambiguity, the agent, uncertain about the true probability P, can only work with a collection P of plausible probability measures, or priors, which represent the ambiguity perceived by the agent. This leads to two types of optimal stopping problems. The first type-the so-called robust optimal stopping-maximizes the worst-case expected value inf P∈P E P [e −rτ g(X τ )] (1.2) through the choice of τ ; see Riedel (2009) , Yao (2011a,b, 2014) , Cheng and Riedel (2013) , and Nutz and Zhang (2015) , among many others. The second type, on the other hand, maximizes the best-case expected value sup P∈P E P [e −rτ g(X τ )]; (1.3) see e.g. Bayraktar and Yao (2011a,b) , Ekren et al. (2014) , Belomestny and Krätschmer (2016) , and Bayraktar and Yao (2017) . What is missing in the above literature is the agent's attitude towards ambiguity. Even with the same perceived ambiguity P, different agents may have different levels of ambiguity aversion, as shown empirically in Curley and Yates (1989) and Heath and Tversky (1991) . To accommodate ambiguity attitude, we incorporate the α-maxmin preference, introduced in Ghirardato et al. (2004) , into the optimal stopping framework: the agent intends to maximize where α ∈ [0, 1] is a given constant that reflects the level of ambiguity aversion of the agent. Here, both ambiguity and ambiguity attitude are captured, by P and α, respectively. The case α = 1 amounts to the standard worst-case analysis, reflecting extreme aversion to ambiguity. The other extreme α = 0 depicts a purely ambiguity-loving agent who cares only about the best-case value. The goal of this paper is to investigate stopping behavior under the α-maxmin objective (1.4). A distinctive challenge in solving (1.4) is time inconsistency: an optimal strategy we find today may no longer be optimal at future dates. That is, our future selves may very well deviate from the optimal strategy we set out to employ today. Consequently, finding an optimal stopping time, the ultimate goal in the standard literature, is not meaningful here.
Note that neither the classical problem (1.1) nor the worst-case and best-case problems (1.2) and (1.3) suffers the issue of time inconsistency. Indeed, time consistency of (1.1) simply boils down to the tower property of conditional expectations. While time consistency is generally in question under nonlinear expectations, Epstein and Schneider (2003) show that, for the special cases (1.2) and (1.3), tower property still holds if the set of priors is rectanguler, i.e., stable under pasting conditional distributions. Similar stability conditions are discovered independently, and further refined under great generality, in the literature of mathematical finance; see e.g. Nutz and van Handel (2013) , Bayraktar and Yao (2014) , Ekren et al. (2014) , and Nutz and Zhang (2015) . All the developments ensure certain tower property for the nonlinear expectation (1.2) or (1.3), so that time consistency follows. By contrast, an α-maxmin objective, such as (1.4), does not uphold time consistency, even when the priors are stable under pasting. This is demonstrated in Section 7 of Schröder (2011) and Section 2 of Beissner et al. (2016) . Time inconsistency is a genuine difficulty for (1.4).
As proposed in Strotz (1955) , a sensible way to deal with time inconsistency is consistent planning: knowing that his future selves may overturn his current plan, the agent selects the best present action taking the future disobedience as a constraint. Assuming that every future self will reason in the same way, the resulting strategy is a (subgame perfect) equilibrium, from which no future self has incentive to deviate. How such strategies can be precisely formulated and obtained has been a long-standing problem. In response to this, develop an iterative approach to finding equilibria for time-inconsistent stopping problems. It has been applied to stopping under non-exponential discounting , Zhou (2019, 2017) ) and probability distortion (Huang, Nguyen-Huu and Zhou (2018) ).
In this paper, we extend the framework of Huang and Zhou (2017) to account for the α-maxmin objective (1.4). Equilibrium stopping policies are characterized as fixed-points of an operator Θ, defined in (2.13) below. The central question is whether equilibria can be found via fixed-point iterations. We take up a strong formulation of model ambiguity, where the drift and volatility coefficients of a one-dimensional diffusion X are only assumed to satisfy certain Lipschitz and linear growth conditions, and are otherwise unknown. As shown in Lemmas 3.2 and 3.1, the resulting collection of priors P is relatively compact and X is a regular diffusion under any P ∈ P. The regularity of X immediately yields the convergence of any fixed-point iteration; see Proposition 3.1. To show that the limit of a fixed-point iteration is indeed an equilibrium, appropriate convergence of stopping times and the values at stopping, uniform in P ∈ P, is required. Such uniform convergence is carefully established in Lemma 3.3, relying crucially on both the relative compactness of P and the regularity of X. All this leads to Theorem 3.1, the main result of this paper: every equilibrium can be found via a fixed-point iteration.
Our framework, in particular, sheds new light on real options valuation. The essence of real options valuation is the use of risk-neutral pricing techniques to evaluate the right, but not the obligation, to undertake certain capital investment project. By nature, real options valuation may suffer model ambiguity more severely than pricing a typical financial option: as the underlying asset of a real option is mostly neither tradable nor fully observable, finding a risk-neutral measure relies largely on an agent's estimate. This often leads to a collection of plausible risk-neutral measures and a corresponding interval of plausible values of a real option. By incorporating the α-maxmin preference, the multiple plausible values turns into a single one, i.e., the convex combination of the least and the best values, as in (1.4). This facilitates decisions making: one compares this single value and the value of immediate stopping, to decide whether a project should be postponed or initiated. While the involved stopping problem is now time-inconsistent, the methodology we develop comes into play to locate (time-consistent) equilibrium strategies.
In particular, in the uncertain volatility model introduced by Avellaneda et al. (1995) and Lyons (1995) , when the payoff function of a real option is of the put option type, we provide complete characterizations of not only all the equilibrium strategies, but also the best one among them; see Proposition 4.1 and Theorem 4.1. It demonstrates explicitly the effect of ambiguity attitude: the more ambiguity-averse, the more eager to stop-so as to withdraw from the uncertain environment.
In summary, the main contributions of this paper are as follows:
(i) To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that resolves the time-inconsistent stopping problem under the α-maxmin preference 1 . This allows us to go beyond the standard worst-case (or best-case) analysis under model ambiguity, and capture a more realistic spectrum of behavior. We stress that our collection of priors P is only assumed to be measurable; the "stable under pasting" condition, imposed widely in the literature, is not required.
(ii) Whereas time-inconsistent stopping behavior has been widely investigated, it has been ascribed mostly to non-exponential discounting or probability distortion; see e.g., Grenadier and Wang (2007) , Barberis (2012) , Xu and Zhou (2013) , and Ebert and Strack (2015) , among many others. This paper enriches research on time-inconsistent stopping, by focusing on ambiguity aversion, a cause of time inconsistency that has only been slightly discussed in the literature.
(iii) Our framework provides a new approach for real options valuation. Taking ambiguity attitude into account, via the α-maxmin preference, facilitates decision making under model ambiguity (as discussed above), but it also renders the stopping problem time-inconsistent. The methodology we develop particularly resolves this time-inconsistent problem, allowing us to take full advantage of including ambiguity attitude in decision making.
(iv) Extending the iterative approach from to our multiple-prior setting is nontrivial. It demands several convergence results related to stopping times, uniform across all priors, which are established by a detailed analysis of sample paths and a careful use of the capacity theory; see Lemma 3.3 and its proof in Appendix A.
Moreover, a new measurable projection theorem (Theorem 5.1 below) is established. Classical measurable projection theorems all require one of the spaces involved to be a Borel space endowed with the Borel σ-algebra. By contrast, Theorem 5.1 allows for any general measurable spaces. In our multiple-prior setting, for the fixed-point operator Θ to be well-defined, Borel measurability, used in the single-prior framework of and Huang and Zhou (2017) , is no longer adequate, and the more general universal measurability is needed; see Proposition 2.1. In particular, showing that (1.4) is universally measurable demands Theorem 5.1, which does not require specific Borel structure; see Lemma 2.2 and Remark 2.2.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the general set-up, including the formulations of the time-inconsistent stopping problem under model ambiguity and the corresponding fixed-point operator. In Section 3, under both drift and volatility uncertainty of a one-dimensional diffusion, we show that every equilibrium stopping policy is the limit of a fixedpoint iteration. Section 4 applies our theoretic results to a concrete real options valuation problem; all equilibrium stopping policies, and the best one among them, are explicitly characterized. Section 5 is devoted to the derivation of a new, generalized measurable projection theorem, which is required in Section 2. Appendix A presents the technical proof of Lemma 3.3.
The Set-up
For any Polish space M , we denote by B(M ) the Borel σ-algebra of M , and by U (M ) the σ-algebra consisting of all universally measurable sets in M . Let P(M ) be the set of all probability measures on (M, B(M )). Each P ∈ P(M ) can be uniquely extended to U (M ), and we do not distinguish between P and its extension throughout this paper.
Consider the canonical space Ω := C([0, ∞); R d ). For each t > 0, we define Ω t := C([0, t]; R d ). Let B denote the canonical process B t (ω) := ω t for all ω ∈ Ω, and let F B = (F B t ) t≥0 be the natural filtration generated by B. Recall that
(2.1)
For each P ∈ P(Ω), let F P = (F P t ) t≥0 be the P-augmentation of F B . We then define the universal filtration F = (F t ) t≥0 by
Note that F is right-continuous, thanks to the right-continuity of F P for all P ∈ P(Ω). Moreover,
We denote by T the set of all F-stopping times. Let us introduce a general, albeit time-homogeneous, formulation of model ambiguity. For any
and let P(x) ⊆ {P ∈ P(Ω) : P(Ω x ) = 1 and B is strong Markov under P} (2.3) denote the set of priors of an agent at the state x ∈ R d . That is, every P ∈ P(x) is believed by the agent to be a possibly true description of how the process B will evolve, given that its current value is x ∈ R d . Note that P(x) is not necessarily dominated by some reference probability P * with respect to which all P ∈ P(x) are absolutely continuous. In other words, some elements in P(x) may be mutually singular, which in particular covers the case of volatility uncertainty in a diffusion model of B; see Section 4 for a detailed example.
The α-maxmin Objective
Consider a payoff function g : R d → R. An agent, with discount rate r > 0, intends to maximize E P [e −rτ g(B τ )] by choosing an appropriate τ ∈ T , subject to the uncertainty P ∈ P(x) at the current state x ∈ R d . Such a stopping problem has been substantially studied, yet almost always in the worst-case (or best-case) scenario. Stated in the current setting, the literature is focused on finding τ * ∈ T that maximizes the worst-case (or best-case) value, i.e., inf
A large number of references can be found in the introduction. Practical decision making, however, is much more complicated than the worst-case (or bestcase) analysis. What is missing in (2.4) is the agent's attitude towards ambiguity: even with the same perceived ambiguity P(x), different agents may have different levels of ambiguity aversion. Indeed, as shown empirically in Curley and Yates (1989) and Heath and Tversky (1991) , ambiguity attitude is heterogeneous among individuals: some can be much less ambiguity-averse than others under various circumstances. To accommodate ambiguity attitude, a general model of utility maximization has been developed in Ghirardato et al. (2004) and Klibanoff et al. (2005) . In particular, the α-maxmin preference, a popular, straightforward version of the general model, stipulates that, at the current state x ∈ R d , the agent maximizes 5) where α ∈ [0, 1] is a given constant that reflects the level of ambiguity aversion of the agent. Here, both ambiguity and ambiguity attitude are captured, by P(x) and α, respectively. The case α = 1 (resp. α = 0) corresponds to the standard worst-case (resp. best-case) problem, reflecting extreme aversion to (resp. desire for) ambiguity. It is the scope of this paper to investigate the diverse stopping behavior between these two extremes, i.e., for any α ∈ [0, 1].
Time Inconsistency
When solving the problem
the issue of time inconsistency arises: an optimal strategy we find today may no longer be optimal at future dates. Specifically, suppose an optimal stopping time τ x ∈ T exists for (2.6), for all x ∈ R d . The problem (2.6) is said to be time-consistent if for any x ∈ R d and t ≥ 0,
If the above condition fails to hold, (2.6) is said to be time-inconsistent. A critical condition time consistency hinges on is the tower property of conditional expectations. In the worst case (or best-case) scenario, Epstein and Schneider (2003) shows that time consistency holds if the set of priors is rectanguler, i.e., stable under pasting conditional distributions. Similar stability conditions are proposed under great generality in the literature of mathematical finance; see Nutz and van Handel (2013) , Bayraktar and Yao (2014) , Ekren et al. (2014) , and Nutz and Zhang (2015) . The technical endeavor in these works ensures certain tower property of nonlinear conditional expectations in the form of (2.4), so that time consistency follows.
By contrast, time inconsistency is inherent in (2.6). Even when the priors are stable under pasting, an α-maxmin objective does not uphold time consistency. This is demonstrated in detail through an optimal stopping problem in Section 7 of Schröder (2011) , as well as in a simple twoperiod model in Section 2 of Beissner, Lin and Riedel (2016) .
To deal with time inconsistency, we follow consistent planning proposed in Strotz (1955) : one takes into account the potential disobedience of his future selves, and selects the best present action in response to that. If every future self will reason in the same way, the resulting strategy will be a (subgame perfect) equilibrium, from which no future self has incentive to deviate. How to precisely formulate and locate such strategies has been a long-standing challenge. In the context of time-inconsistent stopping, Huang and Nguyen-Huu (2018) develop a versatile iterative approach: equilibrium strategies, formulated as fixed points of an operator, can be found conveniently via fixed-point iterations. It has been applied successfully to optimal stopping under non-exponential discounting , Zhou (2019, 2017) ) and probability distortion (Huang, Nguyen-Huu and Zhou (2018) ). In this paper, we will extend this iteration approach further to account for model ambiguity and ambiguity attitude.
Problem Formulation and Preliminaries
Thanks to the time-homogeneous setup of model ambiguity in (2.3), we can focus on hitting times to regions in R d , instead of dealing with all general stopping times. That is, an agent chooses some R ∈ U (R d ), and stops at the moment
(2.7)
For convenience, we will often call R ∈ U (R d ) a stopping policy.
It is worth noting that we do not restrict ourselves to Borel measurable or analytic stopping policies R, but allow for universally measurable ones. Such generality is important to our subsequent fixed-point formulation, as explained in Remark 2.3 below. With R ∈ U (R d ), the measurability of τ R is nontrivial. Indeed, if we had R ∈ B(R d ), the classical debut theorem (see e.g. Theorem 2.1 in Bass (2010) ) would imply that for any t ≥ 0, {τ R ≤ t} ∈ F P t for all P ∈ P(Ω), which readily yields τ R ∈ T . As the next result shows, much more care needs to be taken for R ∈ U (R d ).
s -measurable. Thanks to (2.1) and Corollary 7.44.1 of Bertsekas and Shreve (1978) , we have the relation
where the equality follows from (2.2). Fix t > 0, by the right continuity of B, we can construct, as in Proposition 1.1.13 of Karatzas and Shreve (1991) , a sequence of discretized processes {B (n) } n∈N , which satisfy B (n)
(2.9)
Now, for each P ∈ P(Ω), thanks to Theorem I.4.14 of Revuz and Yor (1999) and (2.9), we have
To carry out consistent planning proposed in Strotz (1955) , we follow the game-theoretic formulation in Section 2.1 of Huang and Zhou (2017) (in line with Section 3.1 of ). Suppose that the agent initially planned to take R ∈ U (R d ) as his stopping policy. Given the current state x ∈ R d , the agent carries out the game-theoretic reasoning: "assuming that all my future selves will follow R ∈ U (R d ), what is the best stopping strategy today in response to that?" The agent today has only two possible actions: stopping and continuation. If he stops, he gets g(x) right away; if he continues, given that all his future selves will follow R ∈ U (R d ), he will eventually stop at the moment
Given that the agent's ambiguity attitude is characterized by α ∈ [0, 1], this leads to the α-maxmin expected payoff
Remark 2.1. The fact "ρ R ∈ T " can be proved in the same way as in Lemma 2.1. Note the subtle difference between τ R and ρ R : the former involves "t ≥ 0", while the latter "t > 0". In (2.11), as this is the case where the agent at x ∈ R d chooses to continue (without regard to whether x ∈ R), the stopping time in effect is ρ R , not τ R .
In (2.11), we allow ρ R to take the value ∞: if ρ R (ω) = ∞, we define
This is in line with Appendix D of Karatzas and Shreve (1998) . Moreover, to ensure that J(x, R) in (2.11) is well-defined, we impose the following standing assumption throughout the paper.
where we interpret e −r·∞ |g(B ∞ )| := lim sup t→∞ e −rt |g(B t )|, similarly to (2.12).
To find the best stopping policy for today, in response to future selves following R ∈ U (R d ), the agent simply compares the payoffs g(x) and J(x, R). This leads to
where we define
(2.14)
Here, S R , I R , and C R are called the stopping region, the indifference region, and the continuation region, respectively. In particular, on I R , the agent is indifferent between stopping and continuation as they yield the same payoff. There is then no incentive for the agent to deviate from the original stopping policy R ∈ U (R d ). This gives rise to the term I R ∩ R in (2.13). 2 It is of interest to see whether this new region Θ(R), obtained from the original stopping policy R ∈ U (R d ), is again a stopping policy, i.e., Θ(R) ∈ U (R d ). In view of (2.14), this boils down to the universal measurability of x → J(x, R), which will be established in the next result.
Note that the key in the proof below is the use of a non-standard measurable projection theorem (i.e., Theorem 5.1 below) that does not require Borel structure, as is needed in all classical projection theorems. Section 5 will be devoted to the derivation of this new measurable projection theorem.
are universally measurable.
Proof. By Lemma 2.1, universal measurability of g, and Proposition 7.44 of Bertsekas and Shreve (1978) , the function e −rρ R g(B ρ R ), mapping Ω to R, is universally measurable. It follows that f (P) := E P [e −rρ R g(B ρ R )], viewed as a map from P(Ω) to R, is universally measurable, thanks to Corollary 7.46.1 of Bertsekas and Shreve (1978) . For any K ∈ R, this implies that
is universally measurable. Consequently,
is universally measurable, thanks to the assumption that (x, P(x)) : x ∈ R d is universally measurable. Now, observe that
which is universally measurable in R d , thanks to the generalized measurable projection result Theorem 5.1. Thus, we conclude that x → inf P∈P(x) E P [e −rρ R g(B ρ R )] is universally measurable. By a similar argument and the fact that the complement of a universally measurable set is universally measurable, we obtain that x → sup P∈P(x) E P [e −rρ R g(B ρ R )] is also universally measurable.
Remark 2.2. Classical measurable projection theorems (see e.g. Theorem 2.12 of Crauel (2002) or Theorem III.23 of Castaing and Valadier (1977) ) cannot be applied in the proof above, as they all require certain Borel measurability, which need not hold in our case. Specifically, to apply classical theorems, P ∈ P(Ω) : E P [e −rρ R g(X ρ R )] < K needs to be a Borel subset of P(Ω). However, even for R ∈ B(R d ), ρ R in general is only universally measurable; indeed, for any t ≥ 0, {ρ R ≤ t} lies in F P t for all P ∈ P(Ω), but not necessarily in F B t . Thus, even with Borel measurable g, it is only guaranteed that P → E P [e −rρ R g(X ρ R )] is universally measurable, but not Borel measurable.
Proof. By Lemma 2.2, x → J(x, R), defined in (2.11), is universally measurable. This, together with g being universally measurable, implies that all the sets S R , I R , and
Remark 2.3. If we take R to be a Borel (or analytic) set, it is not guaranteed that Θ(R) is also Borel (or analytic). Indeed, for any R ∈ B(R d ), as x → J(x, R) is only universally measurable (recall Remark 2.2), Θ(R) ∈ B(R d ) need not hold. Alternatively, take R to be an analytic set in R d . Even if we show that x → J(x, R) is upper (resp. lower) semi-analytic and thus C R (resp. S R ) is analytic, it is unclear if S R (resp. C R ) is analytic. Whether Θ(R) is analytic is then in question.
In view of Proposition 2.1, Θ defined in (2.13) can be viewed as an operator acting on
An equilibrium is then defined as a fixed point of the operator.
We denote by E the collection of all equilibria.
Remark 2.4 (Existence of an equilibrium). The entire space R d is an equilibrium. Indeed, for any
The general methodology for finding equilibria (other than the entire space R d ) is to perform fixed-point iterations: one starts with an arbitrary R ∈ U (R d ), and apply Θ to it repetitively until an equilibrium is reached. That is, we take
as a candidate equilibrium. To make this idea rigorous, we need to show that (i) the above limittaking is well-defined, i.e., R * ∈ U (R d ), and (ii) R * is indeed an equilibrium, i.e., Θ(R * ) = R * . The next section focuses on establishing (i) and (ii).
Convergence of Fixed-Point Iterations
In this section, under a strong formulation of model ambiguity, we will show that the fixed-point iteration (2.15) indeed converges to an equilibrium, when the involved state process is a onedimensional diffusion. Our analysis crucially relies on the "regular" property of one-dimensional diffusion processes (i.e., (3.6) below). The multi-dimensional case is left for future research. 3
Take d = 1 in the set-up of Section 2. Let P 0 ∈ P(Ω) denote the Wiener measure, under which B is a standard Brownian motion. Let I = (ℓ, r), for some −∞ ≤ ℓ < r ≤ ∞, be a given interval. For any x ∈ I, consider the stochastic differential equation
where ζ := lim n→∞ S n , with S n := inf{t > 0 : X x,b,σ t / ∈ (ℓ + 1/n, r − 1/n)} for all n ∈ N. We assume that X x,b,σ is absorbed at the endpoints of I in the case ζ < ∞. For any y ∈ I and A ∈ U (I), we introduce the hitting times
For simplicity, we will often write X, T x y , and T x A for X x,b,σ , T 
A Strong Formulation of Model Ambiguity
Let us introduce a subset of {(b, σ) : b, σ maps I to R} that help specify the scope of uncertainty we would like to deal with. (ii) let A ∞ be the collection of all set-valued functions Π : I → 2 L satisfying the following: for any x ∈ I, there exists K > 0 such that for any (b, σ) ∈ Π(x),
Here, each Π : I → 2 L identifies the actual ambiguity faced by the agent, depending on the current state x ∈ I. That is, Π(x) ⊆ L is the collection of coefficients (b, σ) in (3.1) that are considered plausible by the agent at x ∈ I.
For each x ∈ I and (b, σ) ∈ L, the Lipschitz and linear growth conditions in Definition 3.1 ensure the existence of a unique strong solution X x,b,σ to (3.1). By viewing X x,b,σ as a map from Ω to itself, we define the probability measure P x b,σ ∈ P(Ω) by
By construction, for any A ⊆ U (Ω),
Now, for any x ∈ I, the collection of probabilities associated with L is given by
Similarly, given Π ∈ A, we introduce
Two important consequences of Definition 3.1, the regularity of X x,b,σ and the relative compactness of P(x), are established in Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2 below.
Lemma 3.1. For any x ∈ I and (b, σ) ∈ L, X x,b,σ is a regular diffusion, i.e., for any x ∈ I, P 0 (T x y < ∞) > 0, ∀y ∈ I.
(3.6)
Proof. Under Definition 3.1, the scale function
is well-defined, strictly increasing, and continuously differentiable. Let q : (s(ℓ), s(r)) → R be the inverse function of s. By the arguments in Proposition 5.5.13 of Karatzas and Shreve (1991) , X being the unique strong solution to (3.1) entails the existence of a unique strong solution to dY t =σ(Y t )dB t , Y 0 = 0, P 0 -a.s., whereσ(y) := s ′ (q(y))σ(q(y)) for s(ℓ) < y < s(r). By Theorem 5.5.4 in Karatzas and Shreve (1991) and σ 2 > 0 on I,σ 2 is locally integrable. Hence, the speed measure m(dy) := 2dỹ σ 2 (y) , s(ℓ) < y < s(r), assigns a finite value to any [a, b] ⊂ (s(ℓ), s(r)). This readily implies that Y is a regular diffusion; see Remark (ii), "The converse to Theorem 47.1", on p.277 of Rogers and Williams (2000) . As X = s −1 (Y ), X is also regular.
Te fact that X is a regular diffusion (i.e., satisfying (3.6)) means that I = (ℓ, r) cannot be decomposed into smaller intervals from which X could not exit. Moreover, when starting with x ∈ I, X has to enter the regions above and below x immediately, as stated below. Rogers and Williams (2000) directly gives T x (ℓ,x) = T x (x,r) = 0 P 0 -a.s.; see also the discussion above Lemma 46.1 therein. Now, for P 0 -a.e. ω ∈ Ω, the fact P 0 (T x (ℓ,x) = 0) = P 0 (T x (x,r) = 0) = 1 implies that for any n ∈ N, there exist t, t ′ ∈ [0, 1/n] such that X t (ω) > x and X t ′ (ω) < x. Hence, T x x (ω) ≤ 1/n for all n ∈ N, implying T x x (ω) = 0.
Corollary 3.1. For any
Proof. Observe from (3.4) that
where the last equality follows from Remark 3.1. The same argument shows that
The following observation will be useful in Section 4.
Remark 3.2. Thanks to Remark 3.1 (or Corollary 3.1), we can follow the arguments in Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2 in Huang and Zhou (2017) to show that for any R ∈ U (I), ρ R = ρ R P x b,σ -a.s., ∀x ∈ I and (b, σ) ∈ L. Consequently, we have S R = S R , I R = I R , and C R = C R . It follows that R ∈ E if and only if R ∈ E.
Focusing on Π ∈ A ∞ yields the relative compactness of P(x).
Lemma 3.2. For any Π ∈ A ∞ , P(x) is relatively compact for all x ∈ I.
Proof. Fix x ∈ I. By Theorem 1.3.1 of Stroock and Varadhan (2006) , P(x) is relatively compact if and only if for any ε > 0 and T > 0,
Thanks to the Lipschitz and linear growth conditions, under the same constant K > 0, in Definition 3.1 (ii), standard estimations, see e.g. Proposition 1.2.1 in Bouchard (2007) , show that there exist constants β, γ > 0 such that for any (b, σ) ∈ Π(x),
where C T > 0 depends on only x ∈ I, T > 0, and K > 0. In view of the proof of Theorem I.2.1 in Revuz and Yor (1999) , (3.8) implies that for any η ∈ [0, γ), there exists C η > 0 such that
This, together with the Markov inequality, shows that for any P ∈ P(x),
which readily yields (3.7).
The Main Result
Corollary 3.1 facilitates the convergence of the fixed-point iteration (2.15), as the next result shows.
Recall that for any Π ∈ A, P(x) is defined as in (3.5).
Proposition 3.1. Fix Π ∈ A such that {(x, P(x)) : x ∈ I} ⊆ I × P(Ω) is universally measurable. Then, for any R ∈ U (I), R ⊆ Θ(R). Hence, R * in (2.15) is well-defined, and of the form
Remark 3.3. Assuming universal measurability of {(x, P(x)) : x ∈ I} in I ×P(Ω) is not restrictive in terms of the related literature. Such a set is typically assumed to be analytic (and thus universally measurable) in the more general path-dependent setting; see e.g., Neufeld and Nutz (2013) , Nutz and van Handel (2013) , and Biagini et al. (2017) .
Proof. Fix R ∈ U (I). For any x ∈ R, we claim that ρ R = 0 P x b,σ -a.s. for all (b, σ) ∈ Π(x). There are three cases: (i) if x is an interior point of R, the claim trivially holds; (ii) if x is a boundary point of R, note that ρ (ℓ,x) = ρ (x,r) = 0 P x b,σ -a.s. (by Corollary 3.1) readily implies ρ R = 0 P x b,σ -a.s., for all (b, σ) ∈ Π(x); (iii) if x is an isolated point of R, note that ρ {x} = 0 P x b,σ -a.s. (by Corollary 3.1) and the fact x ∈ R readily imply ρ R = 0 P x b,σ -a.s., for all (b, σ) ∈ Π(x). With ρ R = 0 P x b,σ -a.s. for all (b, σ) ∈ Π(x), we have J(x, R) = g(x), i.e. x ∈ I R . Hence, we conclude R ⊆ I R , which gives Θ(R) = S R ∪ (I R ∩ R) = S R ∪ R ⊇ R. This, together with Proposition 2.1, shows that {Θ n (R)} n∈N is an nondecreasing sequence of sets in U (I), leading to the last assertion.
The remaining question is whether the limit R * of the fixed-point iteration (2.15) is indeed an equilibrium. To answer this, we need the following technical result, which requires Π ∈ A ∞ . Lemma 3.3. For any nondecreasing sequence {R n } n∈N in U (I), set R 0 := n∈N R n and let ρ n and ρ 0 denote the hitting times ρ Rn and ρ R 0 , defined in (2.10), respectively. Then, for any x ∈ I,
Furthermore, for any Π ∈ A ∞ and ε > 0, we have
Remark 3.4. In (3.10), ρ n and ρ 0 may take the value ∞. In particular, on {ρ 0 = ∞}, ρ n = ρ 0 = ∞ and we define ρ n − ρ 0 = 0, for all n ∈ N. This is consistent with (2.12), where we do not distinguish between any two stopping times when they both take the value ∞.
The proof of Lemma 3.3, relying crucially on both the relative compactness of P(x) and the regularity of X x,b,σ , is relegated to Appendix A. Now, we are ready to present the main result of this paper.
Theorem 3.1. Fix Π ∈ A ∞ such that {(x, P(x)) : x ∈ I} ⊆ I × P(Ω) is universally measurable. Suppose that g : I → R is continuous and
Then, for any R ∈ U (I), R * defined in (2.15) belongs to E. Hence,
Proof. Fix R ∈ U (I), and consider R * defined in (2.15). Recall from Proposition 3.1 that R n := Θ n (R), n ∈ N ∪ {0}, form a nondecreasing sequence in U (I) and R * = n∈N R n . We will denote by ρ n and ρ * the hitting times ρ Rn and ρ R * , defined in (2.10), respectively. To show R * ∈ E, i.e., Θ(R * ) = R * , we first note that it suffices to prove S R * ⊆ R * . This is because Θ(R * ) = S R * ∪ R * , thanks to the proof of Proposition 3.1. To this end, foy any x / ∈ R * , we aim to show that x / ∈ S R * . As R * = n∈N R n , we have x / ∈ R n = Θ n (R) for all n ∈ N. In view of (2.13) and (2.14), this implies
(3.14)
If we can show that
we immediately obtain J(x, R * ) ≥ g(x) from (3.14), and thus x / ∈ S R * , as desired. The rest of the proof focuses on deriving (3.15).
First, let us consider p := sup{y ∈ R * : y < x} and q := inf{y ∈ R * : y > x}, where we take p = ℓ (resp. q = r) if there is no y < x (resp. y > x) lying in R 0 . Similarly, we define p n := sup{y ∈ R n : y < x} and q n := inf{y ∈ R n : y > x}, ∀n ∈ N.
As R * = n∈N R n and {R n } n∈N is nondecreasing, we have p n ↑ p and q n ↓ q. For the case where p n = p and q n = q for n large enough, ρ n = ρ 0 on Ω x , and thus J(x, R n ) = J(x, R * ), for all n large enough. That is, (3.15) holds trivially. Hence, in the rest of the proof, we assume that p n is strictly increasing, or q n is strictly decreasing. Take η > 0, and choose n * ∈ N such that max{|p n − p|, |q n − q|} < η for all n ≥ n * . Note that there exists M > 0 such that e −rρ n |g(B ρ n )| < M, ∀n ≥ n * , P-a.s., for all P ∈ P(x). (3.16) Indeed, for any n ≥ n * , if ρ n = ∞, e −rρ n g(B ρ n ) = 0 P-a.s. thanks to (3.12); for all n ≥ n * such that ρ n < ∞, as B ρ n takes values on ([p − η, p] ∪ [q, q + η]) ∩ I, the continuity of g yields the desired boundedness. Thus, by the dominated convergence theorem and (3.9),
On the other hand, by the definition of J in (2.11), (3.14) implies that for any P ∈ P(x),
As n → ∞, we deduce from (3.17) that α inf
Hence, to prove (3.15), it remains to show that
Thanks to (3.12), for any n ≥ n * ,
where κ : R + → R + is a modulus of continuity of g on the domain ([p − η, p] ∪ [q, q + η]) ∩ I, and C > 0 is a constant independent of n, thanks to the boundedness of g(B ρ * ) and the Lipschitz continuity of x → e −rx on [0, ∞). Fix ε > 0. Take δ > 0 such that κ(z) < ε/2 for z < δ. Then,
By (3.10) and (3.11), this implies
That is, e −rρ n g(B ρ n ) converges to e −rρ * g(B ρ * ) in capacity, in the sense of Definition 3.4 of Cohen et al. (2011) . Now, by Theorem 3.2 in Cohen et al. (2011), (3.19) and (3.16) together imply
Then, (3.15) is verified, which completes the proof.
Application to Real Options Valuation
Coined by Myers (1977) and popularized by McDonald and Siegel (1986) , real options valuation refers to applying financial option pricing techniques to corporate investment decision making. The essence is the use of risk-neutral pricing to evaluate the right, but not the obligation, to undertake certain business plan, such as initiating, abandoning, expanding, or contracting a capital investment project. Traditionally, this boils down to an optimal stopping problem under a risk-neutral measure, whose solution dictates optimal timing or scheduling of investment outlays. By nature, real options valuation may suffer model ambiguity more severely than pricing a typical financial option: as the underlying asset of a real option is mostly neither tradable nor fully observable, finding a risk-neutral measure relies largely on an agent's estimate and belief. This often leads to a collection of plausible risk-neutral measures and a corresponding interval of plausible values of a real option.
How to deal with these multiple values is unclear in the literature. Standard investment models assume that agents are completely ambiguity-averse, considering solely the worst case, i.e., the least value of the real option; see e.g., Nishimura and Ozaki (2007) , Trojanowska and Kort (2010) , and Miao and Wang (2011) . On the other hand, many empirical studies, including Heath and Tversky (1991) and Bhidé (1999) , suggest heterogeneous ambiguity attitude, towards the same investment opportunities, among investors-some can be quite ambiguity-loving.
In this section, we incorporate the α-maxmin preference into real options valuation. This yields an immediate benefit: α ∈ [0, 1], which measures an agent's ambiguity aversion, turns the multiple values of a real option into one, i.e., the convex combination of the least and the best values, weighted by α and 1 − α, respectively. There is, however, a downside of it: the decision making problem now becomes time-inconsistent. Note that a related stopping problem under the α-maxmin preference was introduced, but not solved, in Schröder (2011) , precisely because of the time inconsistency involved. In contrast to this, we will resolve a practical real options valuation problem under the α-maxmin preference, on strength on the developments in Section 2 and 3: all equilibria, as well as the best one among them, will be fully characterized.
Specifically, we take the payoff function of the real option to be g(x) := (K − x) + for some given K > 0. The underlying asset X is taken as a geometric Brownian motion, i.e., for some b ∈ R and σ > 0, yet an investor is uncertain about the true values of b and σ. We also assume that there is a known riskfree rate r > 0. Recall that risk-neutral pricing stipulates that (i) the discount rate employed should be the riskfree rate r > 0; (ii) under a risk-neutral measure, X should follow the dynamics (4.1) with b = r. Hence, for real options valuation, drift uncertainty does not play a role, as we always take b = r. Volatility uncertainty, on the other hand, gives rise to a collection of plausible risk-neutral measures: similarly to (3.3), each plausible σ > 0 corresponds to P x σ := P 0 • (X x,r,σ ) −1 .
Following the uncertain volatility model in Avellaneda et al. (1995) and Lyons (1995) , we assume that σ ≤ σ ≤ σ, for some known constants 0 < σ < σ. In view of the setup in Sections 2 and 3, we have I = (0, ∞) and the expected payoff (2.11) now takes the form
where T R is defined similarly to (3.2) as T R := inf{t > 0 : X x,r,σ t ∈ R}. Our goal is to characterize all (closed) equilibria R, and find the best oneR among them; recall from Remark 3.2 that it suffices to focus on closed equilibria in the current setting. To this end, we need to first introduce an optimality criterion for an equilibrium. For any R ∈ E, we define
Definition 4.1.R ∈ E is called an optimal equilibrium, if for any R ∈ E, we have
This criterion, introduced in Huang and Zhou (2019) , is rather strong: it requires a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium to dominate any other equilibrium on the entire state space. For stopping problems under non-exponential discounting, Huang and Zhou (2019) and Huang and Zhou (2017) establish the general existence of an optimal equilibrium, when the discount function induces decreasing impatience. In an example of optimal stopping under probability distortion, derive an optimal equilibrium; see Section 4.3 therein. For the current real options valuation problem under model ambiguity, we will show that an optimal equilibrium also exists.
Let us start with characterizing equilibria that are contained in (0, K]. It will be shown in the end that this focus on (0, K] is not restrictive at all.
Lemma 4.1. For any R ∈ E that is closed and contained in (0, K], R = (0, a] for some a ∈ (0, K].
Proof. Define a := sup{x : x ∈ R} ≤ K. By contradiction, suppose that there exists x ∈ (0, a) such that x / ∈ R. Consider p := sup{y ∈ R : y < x} and q := inf{y ∈ R : y > x},
where the supremum is taken to be 0 if there exists no y ∈ R such that y < x. By the closedness of R, we have p < x < q and hence ρ R > 0 P 0 -a.s. In view of (4.2), this implies
where the last inequality follows from X x,r,σ being a P 0 -submartingale for all σ ≤ σ ≤ σ, as r > 0. It follows that x ∈ S R , a contradiction to R being an equilibrium.
To obtain the converse of Lemma 4.1-for which a > 0 the set R = (0, a] is an equilibriumrequires a detailed analysis on the map x → J(x, (0, a] ). For each a ∈ (0, K), we define
x,r,σ a
where T x,r,σ a is defined similarly to (3.2) as
Thanks to the formula on p.628 of Borodin and Salminen (2002) ,
It follows that
, for a ≤ x < ∞, (4.6) Let us define
σ 2 , and a
The next result collects useful properties of Λ(x, a).
Lemma 4.2. The function Λ : {(x, a) ∈ (0, ∞)×(0, K] : x > a} → R in (4.6) satisfies the following properties. First, for any a ∈ (0, K),
is strictly decreasing and strictly convex on (a, ∞), with Λ(a, a) = K − a and lim x→∞ Λ(x, a) = 0;
(ii) if a < a * , the two functions x → Λ(x, a) and x → (K − x) + intersect exactly once at some
Moreover, for any x ≥ a * ,
Proof. It can be checked directly from (4.6) that (i) holds. For (ii) and (iii), it suffices to check the slope of Λ(x, a) at x = a. Because
we have lim x↓a Λ x (x, a) < −1 if and only if a < a * . Now, with the properties in (i), if a < a * , lim x↓a Λ x (x, a) < −1 implies that Λ(x, a) intersects (K − x) + exactly once at some
To prove (iv), fix x ≥ a * . In view of (4.6), for any a ∈ (a * , x ∧ K), 9) where the second line follows from (
By (4.9) and (4.10), (4.8) leads to
Recalling that m 1 > m 2 > 0 and a x < 1 for a ∈ (a * , x∧K), the above inequality implies Λ a (x, a) < 0, as desired.
A complete characterization of closed equilibria contained in (0, K] can now be established. Proof. In view of Lemma 4.1, to prove the first assertion, it suffices to show that (0, a] ∈ E if and only if a ≥ a * . Observe that (0, a] ∈ E if and only if J(x, (0, a]) ≥ g(x) = (K − a) + for all x > a. As J(x, (0, a]) = Λ(x, a), Lemma 4.2 asserts that this holds if and only if a ≥ a * .
Take an arbitrary R = (0, a] ∈ E (0,K] , with a > a * . By definition,R :
. Hence, we conclude that J(x,R) ≥ J(x, R) for all x ∈ I, and thus
Now, we show that focusing on equilibria contained in (0, K] is by no means restrictive. Lemma 4.3. For any R ∈ E that is closed, setā := sup{x ∈ R : x ≤ K}. Then, we have
Proof. Note that R ∩ (0, K] = ∅ must hold. If not, we would have J(x, R) = 0 < K − x = g(x) for all 0 < x < K, a contradiction to R ∈ E. Hence,ā is well-defined with 0 <ā ≤ K.
To show R ∩ (0, K] = (0,ā], assume to the contrary that there exists x ∈ (0,ā) such that x / ∈ R. Similarly to the proof of Lemma 4.1, by considering p and q as in (4.3) and carrying out the calculation as in (4.4), we get J(x, R) < K − x = g(x), a contradiction to R ∈ E.
To show (0,ā] ∈ E, it suffices to proveā ≥ a * , thanks to Proposition 4.1. Assume to the contrary thatā < a * . Considerb := inf{x ∈ R : x > K} ≥ K. For any x ∈ (ā,b), note that
Hence, J(x, R) ≤ J(x, (0,ā]) for all x ∈ (ā,b). By Lemma 4.2 (ii),ā < a * implies that there exists δ > 0 small enough such that J(x, (0,ā]) = Λ(x,ā) < (K − x) + = g(x) for x ∈ (ā,ā + δ). Thus, we have J(x, R) ≤ J(x, (0,ā]) < g(x) for x ∈ (ā,ā + δ), a contradiction to R ∈ E.
To show the last assertion, note that ifā = K, it holds trivially that J(x, R) = J(x, (0,ā]) for all x ∈ I. Now, assumeā < K, and considerb as above. Clearly, J(x, R) = J(x, (0,ā]) for all x ∈ I \ (ā,b). For any x ∈ (ā,b), by the same calculation as in (4.11), we get J(x, R) ≤ J(x, (0,ā]). We then conclude that J(x, R) ≤ J(x, (0,ā]) for all x ∈ I.
Lemma 4.3 indicates that every closed equilibrium is dominated by another one contained in (0, K]. Consequently, in terms of finding an optimal equilibrium, it is enough to focus on (0, K]. This, together with Proposition 4.1, immediately yields the following.
Theorem 4.1.R := (0, a * ], with a * defined in (4.7), is an optimal equilibrium.
Remark 4.1. If one views a * in (4.7) as a function in α ∈ [0, 1], it can be easily checked that a * is strictly increasing. That is, the larger α (i.e., the more ambiguity-averse), the larger the optimal equilibrium (0, a * ]. Intuitively speaking, if an agent is rather ambiguity-averse (i.e., with a large α), he has strong intention to withdraw from the ambiguous environment-by stopping, in our current context. Hence, he prefers a large stopping threshold a * , so that he can stop quickly once X drifts only slightly below K > 0, which yields a positive (yet small) payoff K − a * . On the other hand, if an agent is rather ambiguity-loving (i.e., with a small α), he has strong intention to stay in the ambiguous environment, to fully exploit the downward potential of X. Hence, he delays stopping by choosing a small stopping threshold a * .
Remark 4.2. Theorem 4.1 is consistent with the standard case without ambiguity. Indeed, when there is no model ambiguity (i.e., σ = σ = σ), a * in (4.7) reduces to
This is exactly the optimal stopping threshold for the classical problem
see e.g., Theorem 2.7.2 in Karatzas and Shreve (1998) .
Estimating the riskfree rate r > 0 is essential to real options valuation. Our analysis can easily accommodate additional uncertainty concerning the riskfree rate.
Remark 4.3. Suppose that the riskfree rate r > 0 is only known to lie in [r, r], for some given constants 0 < r < r < ∞. By taking m 1 := 2r σ 2 and m 2 := 2r σ 2 in (4.7), all subsequent analysis still holds, leading to a corresponding version of Theorem 4.1: (0, a * ] is an optimal equilibrium, where a * is defined as in (4.7) with the updated m 1 and m 2 .
The analysis in this section can also be extended to some extend beyond the risk-neutral pricing framework, to incorporate both drift and volatility uncertainty. in (4.7), all subsequent analysis still holds, leading to a corresponding version of Theorem 4.1: (0, a * ] is an optimal equilibrium, where a * is defined as in (4.7) with the updated m 1 and m 2 .
A Generalized Measurable Projection Theorem
A measurable projection theorem typically involves the product of two measurable spaces, and studies whether the projection of a measurable set in the product space is still measurable. Classical results, see e.g. Theorem 2.12 of Crauel (2002) or Theorem III.23 of Castaing and Valadier (1977) , all require one of the two spaces to be a Borel space endowed with the Borel σ-algebra.
As pointed out in Remark 2.2, this does not serve our needs in the proof of Lemma 2.2, where Borel measurability is elusive. This section is devoted to establish a new, generalized measurable projection theorem that accommodates any two general measurable spaces; see Theorem 5.1 below, one of the major contributions of this paper. Let us start with the notion of separated measurable spaces. Given a set M , a collection C of subsets M is said to separate the points of M if for any distinct y 1 , y 2 ∈ M , there exists A ∈ C that contains exactly one of y 1 and y 2 . The next definition is taken from Section 8.6 of Cohn (1993) .
Definition 5.1. A measurable space (M, A) is said to be separated if A separates the points of M , and countably generated if there exists {A i } i∈N in A such that A = σ({A i } i∈N ).
Remark 5.1. If a measurable space (M, A) is countably generated, it can be shown that A separates the points of M if and only if {A i } i∈N separates the points of M ; see e.g. Lemma III.24 of Castaing and Valadier (1977) . Consequently, (M, A) being both separated and countably generated is the same as the notion "separability" defined in Definition III.24 of Castaing and Valadier (1977) .
The benefit of (M, A) being separated and countably generated is that it can be analyzed much more easily-as if endowed with a Borel σ-algebra. This is stated precisely in the next result, taken from Proposition III.25 of Castaing and Valadier (1977) and Corollary 8.6.4 of Cohn (1993) .
Lemma 5.1. Let (M, A) be a separated and countably generated measurable space. Then, there exists a subset K of {0, 1} N such that (M, A) is isomorphic to (K, B(K)).
On strength of Lemma 5.1, a generalized measurable projection theorem can be readily established, for the special case where the two measurable spaces are separated and countably generated.
To state the result appropriately, let us introduce additional notation. Given a measurable space (M, A), we denote by A µ the augmentation of A by µ-null sets, for any finite measure µ on (M, A). LetÂ be the universal completion of A, i.e.
A := {A µ : µ is a finite measure on (M, A)}.
Lemma 5.2. Let (M 1 , A 1 ) and (M 2 , A 2 ) be two measurable spaces that are separated and countably generated. For any G ∈ A 1 ⊗ A 2 , its projection proj M 1 (G) belongs toÂ 1 .
Proof. In view of Lemma 5.1, there exist isomorphisms
If follows that there is a one-to-one correspondence between elements in A 1 ⊗A 2 and those in B(K 1 )⊗B(K 2 ). Moreover, by Lemma III.26 of Castaing and Valadier (1977) , i 1 is not only (A 1 , B(K 1 ))-measurable, but (Â 1 , G(K 1 ))-measurable, where G(K 1 ) denotes the σ-algebra generated by analytic subsets of
. By Proposition 7.39 of Bertsekas and Shreve (1978) , proj K 1 (G ′ ) is an analytic subset of K 1 . It follows that i
Extending Lemma 5.2 to accommodate any two arbitrary measurable spaces requires the following technical result.
Lemma 5.3. Let (M 1 , A 1 ) and (M 2 , A 2 ) be two measurable spaces. For any G ∈ A 1 ⊗ A 2 , there exist A ∈ A 1 and a set-valued function Φ : A → A 2 such that (i) G is the graph of Φ;
(ii) for any y, z ∈ A satisfying 1 C (y) = 1 C (z) for all C ∈ A 1 , we have Φ(y) = Φ(z).
Proof. Consider the collection Γ := {G ∈ A 1 ⊗ A 2 : ∃A ∈ A 1 and Φ : A → A 2 such that (i) and (ii) hold}.
First, observe that Γ includes all sets of the form H = A × B, with A ∈ A 1 and B ∈ A 2 . Indeed, the constant set-valued function Φ(y) := B, for all y ∈ A, obviously has H as its graph and satisfies (ii) in a trivial way. Now, we claim that Γ is a σ-algebra. As argued above, M 1 × M 2 ∈ Γ. Next, for any G ∈ Γ, take A ∈ A 1 and Φ : A → A 2 such that (i) and (ii) hold. Define the set-valued function Ψ :
As Φ satisfies (ii), so does Ψ by definition. It can also be checked that the graph of Ψ is G c . This implies G c ∈ Γ. Finally, for any {G n } n∈N in Γ, take {A n } n∈N in A 1 and Φ n : A n → A 2 such that G n is the graph of Φ n and Φ n satisfies (ii) for all n ∈ N. Let A := n∈N A n ∈ A 1 , and define the set-valued functionΨ :
With Φ n satisfying (ii) for all n ∈ N,Ψ by definition also satisfies (ii). It can also be checked that the graph ofΨ is n∈N G n . This implies n∈N G n ∈ Γ. As Γ is a σ-algebra containing H = A × B for all A ∈ A 1 and B ∈ A 2 , we must have A 1 ⊗ A 2 ⊆ Γ, which yields the desired result. Now, we are ready to present the main result of this section.
Theorem 5.1. Let (M 1 , A 1 ) and (M 2 , A 2 ) be two measurable spaces. For any G ∈ A 1 ⊗ A 2 , its projection proj M 1 (G) belongs toÂ 1 .
Proof. Fix G ∈ A 1 ⊗ A 2 . Consider
First, we claim that G ∈ C 1 ⊗ C 2 for some C 1 ∈ C 1 and C 2 ∈ C 2 . Observe that
Indeed, as the right hand side of (5.1) is a σ-algebra and it contains all sets of the form H = A × B with A ∈ A 1 and B ∈ A 2 (this is because H ∈ C 1 ⊗ C 2 , for any C 1 ∈ C 1 that contains A and any C 2 ∈ C 2 that contains B), we obtain the "⊆" relation in (5.1). Because the "⊇" relation is trivial, (5.1) is established. Our claim is therefore proved. Define an equivalence relation on M 1 as follows: for any y, z ∈ M 1 , y ∼ z if and only if 1
Set M ′ 1 := M 1 / ∼, the quotient space induced by ∼, and define ϕ 1 :
One can deduce from (5.2) and (5.3) that for any C 1 , C 2 ∈ C 1 ,
Let us check that
1 , where the second equality follows from the definition of
1 is a surjection and C 1 is countably generated,
. This shows that C ′ 1 separates the points of M ′ 1 . Therefore, the measure space (M ′ 1 , C ′ 1 ) is separated and countably generated. In a similar fashion, we can define an equivalence relation on M 2 as in (5.2), with C 1 replaced by C 2 . Then, ϕ 2 : M 2 → M ′ 2 can be introduced as in (5.3), with M 1 and M ′ 1 replaced by M 2 and M ′ 2 := M 2 / ∼. The same argument above implies that (M ′ 2 , C ′ 2 ), with C ′ 2 := ϕ 2 (C 2 ), is separated and countably generated.
Recall that G ∈ C 1 ⊗ C 2 . By Lemma 5.3, there exist C * ∈ C 1 and a set-valued function Φ : C * → C 2 , such that G is the graph of Φ and Φ(y) = Φ(z) whenever y ∼ z. Note that Φ can be extended to the entire space M 1 by setting Φ(y) = ∅ for y / ∈ C * . Define ψ 1 : M ′ 1 → M 1 as follows: for any [y] ∈ M ′ 1 , let ψ 1 ([y]) := z for some z ∈ M 1 with z ∼ y. Then, we deduce from (5.2) that for any C ∈ C 1 , ψ −1 1 (C) = ϕ 1 (C) ∈ C ′ 1 ; that is, ψ 1 is (C ′ 1 , C 1 )-measurable. Define ψ 2 : M ′ 2 → M 2 in the same manner: for any [y] ∈ M ′ 2 , let ψ 2 ([y]) := z for some z ∈ M 2 with z ∼ y. Similarly, ψ 2 is (C ′ 2 , C 2 )-measurable. Now, by considering ϕ 2 as a function from C 2 to C ′ 2 , we introduce the set-valued function Ψ from M ′ 1 to C 
A Proof of Lemma 3.3
Fix x ∈ I. Consider p := sup{y ∈ R 0 : y < x} and q := inf{y ∈ R 0 : y > x},
where we take p = ℓ (resp. q = r) if there is no y < x (resp. y > x) lying in R 0 . Similarly, define p n := sup{y ∈ R n : y < x} and q n := inf{y ∈ R n : y > x}, ∀n ∈ N.
As R 0 = n∈N R n and {R n } n∈N is nondecreasing, we have p n ↑ p and q n ↓ q.
Proof of (3.9). On the set {ρ 0 = ∞}, ρ n = ρ 0 = ∞ for all n ∈ N, and thus (3.9) trivially holds. On the set {ρ 0 < ∞}, B ρ 0 = p or q. We assume B ρ 0 = p without loss of generality. If p ∈ R 0 , then p ∈ R n for all n large enough. Consequently, ρ n = ρ 0 for all n large enough. If p / ∈ R 0 , then B has to enter the region (ℓ, p) immediately after ρ 0 . As p n ↑ p, this implies ρ n ↓ ρ 0 . Thus, (3.9) is established.
Proof of (3.10). Fix ε > 0. First, note that if p n = p and q n = q for n large enough, then ρ n = ρ 0 on Ω x for all n large enough, whence (3.10) follows trivially. It remains to deal with the case where (i) p n is strictly increasing, or (ii) q n is strictly decreasing.
For any n ∈ N, define A n := {ω ∈ Ω x : |ρ n − ρ 0 | ≥ ε}. By (3.9), (A n ) n∈N is nonincreasing and n∈N A n = ∅. For the case where (i) and (ii) both hold, observe that A n \ A n ⊆ F n , where F n := {ω ∈ Ω x : ρ 0 < ∞, B t ∈ [p n , q n ] ∀t ∈ (ρ 0 , ρ 0 + ε), ∃s ∈ (ρ 0 , ρ 0 + ε) s.t. B s = p n or q n }, ∀n ∈ N.
By the definition of F n , we have ) t≥0 ∈ F n } consists of sample paths such that T p n (ℓ,pn) > 0 or T q n (qn,r) > 0, it must be a P 0 -null set in view of Remark 3.1. Moreover, F n ∩ F m = ∅ for all n < m, as p n is strictly increasing and q n is strictly decreasing. It follows that which is exactly (3.10).
Now, for the case where only one of (i) and (ii) holds, we assume without loss of generality that (i) holds. Let A p,q n denote the set A n in the previous case where both (i) Proof of (3.11). Fix 0 < ε < q − p. First, note that if p n = p and q n = q for n large enough, then ρ n = ρ 0 on Ω x for all n large enough, whence (3.11) follows trivially. It remains to deal with the case where (i) p n is strictly increasing, or (ii) q n is strictly decreasing. For any n ∈ N, define A n := {ω ∈ Ω x : |B ρ n − B ρ 0 |1 {ρ n <∞} ≥ ε}. By (3.9), (A n ) n∈N is nonincreasing for n large enough and n∈N A n = ∅. We first deal with the case where (i) and (ii) both hold. For n large enough such that max{|p n − p|, |q n − q|} < ε, observe that A n \ A n ⊆ F n := F 1 n ∪ F 2 n , where
n := {ω ∈ Ω x : B ρ 0 = q, B t ≤ q n ∀t ∈ (ρ 0 , ρ {pn} ), ∃s ∈ (ρ 0 , ρ {pn} ) s.t. B s = q n }, F 2 n := {ω ∈ Ω x : B ρ 0 = p, B t ≥ p n ∀t ∈ (ρ 0 , ρ {qn} ), ∃s ∈ (ρ 0 , ρ {qn} ) s.t. B s = p n }.
Note that (A.1) holds in the current context, by the same argument below (A.1). Also, by the definitions of F 1 n and F 2 n , F n ∩ F m = ∅ for all n < m, as p n is strictly increasing and q n is strictly decreasing. It follows that (A.2) is still true. Hence, by using Lemma 7 in Denis et al. (2011) again, we obtain (A.3), which is exactly (3.11).
For the case where only one of (i) and (ii) holds, we can follow the same argument in the last part of the proof of (3.10) to conclude that (3.11) remains valid.
